The Battle of the Java Sea (, ) was a decisive naval battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II.
Allied naval forces suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy on 27 February 1942. In secondary actions over successive days, starting when the main Combined Striking Force (CSF) of two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and nine destroyers, led by the Striking Force commander (EC, Eskadercommandant or Squadron Commander), Rear-Admiral Karel Doorman of the Royal Netherlands Navy, attempted to intercept a Japanese troop convoy in the Java Sea, only to be intercepted by the convoy's larger escort forces. The battle started as a stalemate, but the heavy cruiser Haguro changed the course of the battle when she crippled the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter with gunfire, then torpedoed and sank the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer, sending Doorman's fleet into temporary disorder as the damaged Exeter withdrew. A gunfight between Allied and Japanese destroyers then resulted in the sinking of HMS Electra and shell damage to her opponent Asagumo before Doorman's force turned away, ending the daylight engagement as dusk fell.
However, under the cover of night, Admiral Doorman's ships attempted another attack, during which the destroyer HMS Jupiter accidentally hit a Dutch mine and sank, but the Japanese immediately caught on to their plan, prompting the Haguro and her sister ship Nachi to ambush the Allied fleet with a stealthy long-range torpedo attack. One of Nachi's torpedoes hit the Dutch light cruiser Java, which was instantly blown apart and sank with almost all hands. One of Haguro's torpedoes then hit the Allied flagship, the Dutch light cruiser De Ruyter, which sank to progressive flooding over several hours, killing Admiral Doorman.
The aftermath of the battle included several smaller actions around Java, including the smaller but also significant Battle of Sunda Strait, which saw the sinking of the heavy cruiser USS Houston, the light cruiser HMAS Perth, and the destroyer HNLMS Evertsen, and the second battle of the Java Sea, where the still crippled Exeter and her escorting destroyers were sunk by a Japanese squadron, including Haguro. These defeats led to the dissolution of the Allied fleet as a whole, the scuttling of the Dutch navy, and the Japanese occupation of the entire Dutch East Indies.
Background The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies progressed at a rapid pace as the Japanese advanced from their Palau Islands colony and captured bases in Sarawak and the southern Philippines. They seized bases in eastern Borneo and in northern Celebes while troop convoys, screened by destroyers and cruisers with air support provided by swarms of fighters operating from captured bases, steamed southward through the Makassar Strait and into the Molucca Sea. Opposing the invading forces was a small force consisting of Dutch, American, British and Australian warships, many of them of World War I vintage, initially under the command of American Admiral Thomas C. Hart of ABDAFLOAT.
On 23–24 January 1942 a force of four American destroyers attacked a Japanese invasion convoy in the Makassar Strait at Balikpapan, Borneo. The Japanese ships were anchored off Balikpapan in Borneo. On 13–16 February the Japanese attacked the major oil port of Palembang in eastern Sumatra. Japanese paratroopers fought a pitched battle against Allied defenders around the big Pladjoe oil plants, the largest and most valuable petrochemical installations in the East Indies. On the night of 19–20 February, an Allied force attacked the Japanese eastern invasion force off Bali in the Battle of Badung Strait. Also on 19 February, the Japanese made two air raids on Darwin, on the Australian mainland, one from carrier-based planes and the other by land-based planes, rendering Darwin useless as a supply and naval base to support operations in the East Indies.
Battle
Prelude
Japanese amphibious forces gathered to strike at Java, and on 27 February 1942 the main Allied naval force, under Rear Admiral Karel Doorman, sailed northeast from Surabaya to intercept a convoy of the Japanese eastern invasion force approaching from the Makassar Strait. The Allied eastern strike force consisted of two heavy cruisers (HMS Exeter and USS Houston), three light cruisers (Doorman's flagship HNLMS De Ruyter, HNLMS Java, HMAS Perth), and nine destroyers (HMS Electra, HMS Encounter, HMS Jupiter, HNLMS Kortenaer, HNLMS Witte de With, USS Alden, USS John D. Edwards, USS John D. Ford, and USS Paul Jones). On paper, this seemed a formidable force, but its combat effectiveness was questionable. Belonging to several different navies, the ships had practically no experience in each other's naval doctrine and fighting styles, and most crucially, there was a language barrier between the Dutch-speaking Karel Doorman and the English-speaking US, UK, and Australian ships, hindering communications.
Upon departure, the Allied force was immediately spotted by a Japanese floatplane launched from the convoy's main protection force, commanded by Rear Admiral Takeo Takagi. The main Japanese group consisted of the heavy cruisers Haguro and Nachi (the latter, Takagi's flagship, having launched the floatplane), and the destroyers Kawakaze, Yamakaze, Ushio, and Sazanami. This was supported by a second group led by Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura, consisting of the light cruisers Naka and Jintsū and the destroyers Yūdachi, Samidare, Murasame, Harusame, Minegumo, and Asagumo. Upon learning of the opposing force's movements from Nachi, both groups sailed aside each other at 30 knots to intercept the opposing force. The Japanese heavy cruisers had ten 8-inch (203 mm) guns each and superb torpedoes. By comparison, Exeter was armed only with six 8-inch guns, and only six of Houston's nine 8-inch guns remained operable after her aft turret had been knocked out in an earlier air attack. While underway, Nishimura's group was joined by the nearby destroyers Yukikaze, Amatsukaze, Hatsukaze, and Tokitsukaze, before being attacked by land-based Dutch aircraft and B-17 bombers, but avoided damage due to the planes' poor marksmanship. Captain Tameichi Hara aboard Amatsukaze noted that the planes attacked the Japanese warships, confirming their goal was to mow through the protection force before attacking the convoy and believing it to have been a mistake by the planes to have not attacked the troopships.Hara (1961) Chapter 13
The next day, Doorman's force was tracked by Nachis floatplane while the Japanese fleet rigorously practiced in preparation for the coming engagement. Updates from Nachis floatplane worried the Japanese, as Doorman's ships were in a position to pounce on the vulnerable transport ships, but Doorman ordered his fleet to turn South to refuel at Surabaya. However, upon receiving reports of the Japanese fleet, Doorman immediately turned his ships back to attack the enemy. These actions, perhaps somewhat misunderstood, came as a relief to Admiral Takagi, who Captain Hara recalled saying "The enemy ships were staying clear of our air raids on Surabaya, the enemy is in no shape to fight us." He ordered the convoy to turn around and the escort ships to form up into a fighting formation.
Afternoon battle At 15:48 on 27 February 1942, Amatsukazes chief spotter Shigeru Iwata located Doorman's fleet at 31,600 yards. Captain Hara watched through his binoculars, clearly recognizing De Ruyter's masts as the fleet quickly became visible to the other ships. Admiral Doorman aboard De Ruyter in turn located the enemy force, with a brief scare due to a mistaken claim of battleships in the enemy formation, which was quickly corrected. Still, the allies could not make out any targets besides Haguro and Nachi because of the inferiority of their optical systems to those of the Japanese, because only one of Doorman's ships, the Exeter, carried any form of radar, and because of the language barrier on the Allied side. Still, Doorman ordered his ships to turn west, hoping to prevent the Japanese fleet from crossing his T. With both fleets thereafter sailing in a parallel course, Haguro and Nachi, which were training behind the other ships, could catch up to Nishimura's group.Hornfischer (2006) Chapter 10
By 16:00, spotters on the Electra noticed Jintsū, leading Yukikaze, Amatsukaze, Hatsukaze, Tokitsukaze, at 16,000 yards, and her 4.7-inch (12 cm) guns fired the first shots of the battle, closely followed by all the cruisers and several destroyers. Every ship aimed their guns at Jintsū, straddling her several times, but not a single shell made its mark. The Naka and her group of destroyers returned fire at 24,000 yards, and their shells, too, all missed their mark. Both sides rapidly closed the distance and, frustrated by the ineffective gunfire, Nishimura ordered Naka and his destroyers to fire torpedoes at 15,000 yards, letting out 43 torpedoes. A few exploded after running a few thousand yards; the rest missed. Nishimura's hastiness to engage at long range was later criticized by the Japanese admiralty due to the sheer amount of wasted ammunition. Recognizing this flaw, Takagi ordered all ships to close the range and charge the enemy as he watched his heavy cruisers blast away at long range.
Initial hits Exeter, Houston, and Perth all fired on Haguro and initially claimed to have blown up and sunk her. In fact, Haguro was untouched, as she and Nachi scored the first hits of the battle. Haguro focused her gunfire on De Ruyter, striking her with an 8-inch (203 mm) shell that blasted apart her auxiliary motor room, starting a fire that killed one crewman and injured six others. A second 8-inch (203 mm) shell from Haguro punched through De Ruyter's unarmored portions without exploding. Meanwhile, Admiral Takagi's flagship focused her fire on Houston, which Nachi succeeded in hitting with two 8-inch (203 mm) shells, one punching through her bow and the other holing her stern, which managed to rupture an oil tank. Even when their shells did not directly hit, near-miss and straddle damage still took a toll, Nachi's shells landing as little as 3 yards from Houston.
Jintsū leading a line of destroyers—Yukikaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze, Hatsukaze, Ushio, Sazanami, Yamakaze, and Kawakaze—closed the range by Takagi's order, in the hope of enabling more accurate torpedoing. Electra switched fire to the cluster as 5.9-inch (15 cm) shells from De Ruyter continued to rain on the column. One of Electra's 4.7-inch (12 cm) shells hit Tokitsukaze, causing thick white smoke to burst out of the ship, blinding Amatsukaze behind her. A near miss from De Ruyter then lightly damaged Amatsukaze's hull and dashed water on her bridge. However, neither destroyer was critically damaged. In turn, the destroyers engaged in a gunfight with De Ruyter, although no shells hit their mark. Yukikaze and Tokitsukaze first let out 16 torpedoes at 6,000 yards, followed closely by Amatsukaze, then the five other destroyers behind her. A total of 70 torpedoes were aimed at the enemy, yet not a single hit was made.
Torpedo attack by Haguro