The Battle of Rhodes took place between Italian and German forces for the control of Rhodes, a Greek island in the Italian (1912–1943) Dodecanese islands in the Aegean Sea. The Italian authorities in Rome had been negotiating the Armistice of Cassibile with the Allies and the Germans had been manoeuvring to launch a coup in Italy and Italian-garrisoned areas in southern Europe, at the first sign of treachery to the Axis. German troops had been sent to Rhodes with tanks, artillery and air support. The British deception Operation Mincemeat intended to divert German attention from Sicily may have added to German apprehensions over the Aegean area.
Background When the Armistice of Cassibile was announced, on 8 September 1943, Admiral Inigo Campioni was the governor of the Italian Dodecanese, the Cyclades and the Northern Sporades; his seat was in Rhodes. The military commander of the Italian forces in the archipelago was Rear Admiral Carlo Daviso di Charvensod. With no orders from Rome and no information about the situation of the Italian armed forces, the high command of the Italian armed forces in the Aegean () also in Rhodes, had to choose whether it should remain loyal to the Axis or to Victor Emanuel III. The Italian commands in the Aegean decided to consider the Germans as enemies.
Rhodes garrison Italian
Campioni had his headquarters in Rhodes with his chief of staff was Brigadier-General Roberto Sequi. The Rhodes HQ was subordinate to Army Group East () based in Tirana in Albania. On 1 September 1943, Lieutenant-General Arnaldo Foriero had been sent to Rhodes to assume command of the Italian garrison and to create the Rhodes Military Command but at the time of the German invasion, many of the internal fortifications scheduled to be built were incomplete, due to lack of resources.
The Italian garrison comprised the 50th Infantry Division "Regina" (Major General Michele Scaroina) with four infantry regiments and one artillery regiment equipped with 75/27 mm guns, the 35th, 36th and 55th Static Artillery Groups and the 56th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group. The anti-aircraft group was equipped with 75/27 and 90/53 mm guns and the static artillery groups had 46 batteries and 9 autonomous sections, armed with 210/8 mortars, 149/150 mm howitzers and 105/28 and 75/27 guns. The division had been in the Dodecanese since 1939 and lacked a battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, that had been detached to garrison Karpathos and the 10th Infantry Regiment, which garrisoned Kos. In Rhodes were the artillery regiment (on Mount Fileremo and other positions), the 309th Infantry Regiment, the 331st Infantry Regiment from the 11th Infantry Division "Brennero" and the two remaining battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment. Overall, the army troops available in Rhodes numbered about 34,000 men, with several dozen old vehicles.
There were seven defense areas; the Rhodes Fortress Area was at the northern end of the island, Kalitea Area in the north-east, Kalathos Area in the east, Vati Area which spread from the Lindos promontory in the south-east to Alimia bay in the west and Agios Georgios Area in the north-west. The army controlled all communications within the island, except for those of the coastal batteries and sighting points, which were under Navy control. The commanded the Aegean Military Sea Zone (, Captain Mario Grassi) and the Rhodes Naval Command, (Commander Adriano Arcangioli). The latter controlled a mobile reserve, as well as eight coastal batteries and several anti-aircraft batteries. The coastal batteries were named (on Mount Smith, with three 152/40 mm guns and one 120/50 mm gun) (three 152/40 mm guns and one 102/35 mm gun, located north of the Kalitea thermal baths) (located in Kremasti, with three 120/45 mm and one 76/17 mm gun) (west of the Lindos promontory, with three 152/40, one 102/35 and one 76/17 gun), (east of the Lindos promontory, with three 152/40 and one 102/35 mm gun) (on the eastern coast of the southern end of the island, with three 120/45 and one 76/17 mm gun) (on the western coast of the southern end of the island, with four 120/45 and one 76/17 mm gun), and (in Alimia, with one 76/40 and two 76/50 mm guns); none of them was provided with a radio.
The 3rd MAS Flotilla with three (motor torpedo boats), the 14th Anti-Submarine Group with two submarine chasers, the 39th Minesweeping Flotilla with eight auxiliary minesweepers, the gunboat (immobilised by engine trouble) and the steamer (used as a floating refrigerated warehouse). Naval personnel on the island amounted to about 2,100 men.
The (Air Commodore Alberto Briganti) had 3,000 personnel and about 60–65 aircraft on the island. The Gadurra air base, near Kalathos, had no aircraft, as its torpedo bombers had been transferred to Italy some months earlier and Kattavia Airfield had been abandoned in early 1943 and rendered unusable. The only operational air base was in Maritsa, where the 30th Bombing Wing had twelve bombers, one transport squadron with four Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 and one Savoia-Marchetti SM.75 and a group of 40 fighters, mostly FIAT CR.42 and FIAT G.50, with six Macchi C.202. Ten fighters were unserviceable and only twenty pilots were available. A CANT Z.506 flying boat, used as a hack by the governor, was based in the Mandraki seaplane base; there were also two more CANT Z.506 used as sea rescue aeroplanes and the 147th Maritime Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with CANT Z.501s. The air bases were defended by army 20 mm anti-aircraft cannon.
German
A German attempt to put under its control had failed but eventually the Germans reached an agreement with the to place two 88 mm Flak batteries on the island to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of the air bases. German personnel were to train Italians in using the Flak batteries and then depart but their stay was prolonged on the pretext of the expected shipment of more batteries. Towards the end of January 1943, four German officers, experts in coastal fortification, visited the island, and in April a panzergrenadier battalion was landed in Rhodes. During the following month, two more panzergrenadier battalions arrived.
At the end of June 1943, the German general Ulrich Kleemann was sent to Rhodes, where he formed the Sturm-Division Rhodos, which began military exercise near the Italian defenses about from the city. The Rhodos had a strength of between 6,000 and 8,000 men, and a communication network separate from the Italian system. Its command was established in Campochiaro (now Eleousa); the division included four panzergrenadier battalions with about a hundred guns, anti-tank guns, and 60–70 mortars; a reconnaissance unit with 1,500 men equipped with armed motorcycle sidecars and nearly 60 armoured cars; a tank battalion with over 25 Panzer IVs; four batteries of self-propelled guns, two of them equipped with Wespes and two with Hummel; five 88 mm Flak batteries placed near the air bases and one unit of about 300 Greeks in German uniform. The purpose of the latter was not clear and caused much complaint by the Italian command. The German forces had about 150 armoured fighting vehicles, including Panzer IIs, Panzer IVs, StuG IIIs and fifteen 150 mm self-propelled guns.
Prelude
The announcement of the armistice on 8 September took the Italian leadership and soldiers in Rhodes by surprise; the memorandum with the instructions from the (Italian Supreme Command) to was to be sent by air but bad weather had prevented this and the messenger was still in Pescara on 9 September. On the evening of 8 September, Campioni asked Forgiero to contact Kleeman to exhort him not to give orders that could cause Italian reactions and Kleeman reacted calmly, stating that he would cooperate. Around 20:30, shortly after news of the armistice arrived, Campioni held a meeting at the Palace of the Grand Master; as there were no orders about how to act, no decisions were taken. Lieutenant colonel Marcello Fossetta, in charge of the Maritsa air base, informed the command that the German troops guarding the airport were gathered without weapons and watching a film show, so a sudden attack would be easy to carry out but he was ordered not to act, based on the promises given by Kleeman. Campioni only had the Badoglio Proclamation, which had been broadcast to the other Dodecanese islands, highlighting the last sentence, which ordered Italian forces to react "to eventual attacks from any other source [than the Allies]".
Daviso gave different orders, all ships that were at sea were to head for Leros, except for the MAS and motor torpedo boats, which were to remain in Rhodes; all the ships at Rhodes were ordered to be ready to move on short notice (except the gunboat Sebastiano Caboto, which was immobilized by engine trouble). The coastal batteries were alerted, the guard at the Rhodes Naval Command was strengthened and the naval landing force readied; the Naval Commands of Syros, Leros and Astypalaia were informed of the situation. Any aggressive action by German forces was to be opposed by arms. These instructions later turned out to be in line with the directives issued by (Italian Navy high command) on 9 September. At midnight, Kleeman, now upset, asked Forgiero for permission to freely move his forces to be able to quickly oppose a possible British landing but received a strong refusal.
Battle September 9
During the night, Campioni and Kleemann had a heated argument over the disposition of German troops on the island. According to some (there is no consensus on what was decided) it was agreed that the Rhodos Division would take up positions near Campochiaro, while the German troops at the air bases were to remain outside of their perimeter and any movement of German troops would require authorization by the Italian command. According to others, it was decided that the Germans would stay inside the air bases and would not disarm them if no Italian unit left Rhodes. A British aircraft over Rhodes dropped thousands of leaflets signed by General Henry Maitland Wilson, head of the Middle East Command, ordering the Italians to take control of the German positions and to move their ships and aircraft to British bases; Campioni did not comply, in part because the origin of the leaflets was dubious. At 9:00 a German officer went to the harbour of Rhodes (which the Italians had closed) and asked to occupy it. The port commander, Captain Francesco Bagnus, refused. The German steamer Taganrog, loaded with ammunition, was moored in the harbour and her captain asked for permission to unload and leave the island. Daviso denied authorization and instead posted sentries to guard the ship. After several minutes the harbour was opened and the Germans unloaded the crates containing the ammunition.